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t St. Mary's University School of Law. J.D. Candidate, May 2002; Southwest Texas
State University, M.S. Criminal Justice, May 1999; The University of Texas at Austin. B.A.
Sociology, May 1996. This comment is dedicated to the children and families involved in
the Child Protective Services system, especially the incarcerated mothers struggling and
hoping to maintain their parental rights. I hope that this Comment helps to enable all of
us, especially the Texas Legislature, to work toward keeping Texas families together.
regardless of a parent's detention status. I would like to thank my team members, Natasha
Brooks, Sandra Escamilla and Michelle Holleman, for their input and dedication, and
recognize my editors, Ryan Byrd. Norma Ortiz and Sylvia Rhee. for their tireless vork on
this Comment. I also want to thank all of my friends at CPS in Travis County for their
extraordinary dedication to Texas' children and families. iQute Viva Iz Justicia!
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I. INTRODUCTION
The number of women in prisons across the United States has signifi-
cantly increased in the past decade. For example, the female population
in state prisons increased by 75% between 1986 and 1991.' In 1998, ap-
proximately 942,000 women were being held in correctional facilities
across the United States.' As the population of women in prison in-
creases, so does the number of incarcerated mothers.' Approximately
65% of state female prisoners and 60% of federal female prisoners have
at least one minor child.4 The number of state female prisoners with chil-
dren increased from about 27,000 in 1991 to 48,000 in 1999,' while the
number for federal female prisoners with children increased from approx-
imately 3,000 to 5,000.6 As a result, there are approximately 1.5 million
children with mothers in prison across the United States.
As a former caseworker for Child Protective Services (CPS), some of
the cases I was most concerned with were those involving the removal
and eventual termination or relinquishment of parental rights as a result
of a parent's incarceration.7 My commitment to my job as a caseworker
1. See TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB. No. NCJ-145321, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, SURVEY OF STATE PRISON INMATES, 1991: WOMEN
IN PRISON 1 (1991).
2. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB.
No. NCJ-17688, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, WOMEN OFFENDERS 6
(1999). Women offenders accounted for 16% of the 5,890,300 correctional population in
1998. See id.
3. See Barbara Bloom, Imprisoned Mothers, in CHILDREN OF INCARCERATEl) PAR-
ENTS 21 (Katherine Gabel & Denise Johnston eds., 1995) (stating that an estimated 75% to
80% of women in prisons across the United States are mothers); see also David Crary,
Community Prison Puts Moms, Kids Together, RECORD (Northern New Jersey), at A28
(reporting that the number of incarcerated women nearly doubled to 84,427 between 1990
and 1998); Heidi Morales, Advocacy Group Wants More Access to Kids for Moms in Jail,
CHI. DAILY HERALD, Dec. 13, 1999, at 5, available at 1999 WL 26409448 (citing statistics
reporting that approximately two-thirds of 150,000 incarcerated women are mothers).
4. See CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUn. No. NCJ-182335, Bt-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND TIIEIR
CHILDREN 2 (2000) (estimating that 65.3% and 58.8% of state and federal female prison-
ers, respectively, had at least one minor child); SNELL, supra note 1, at 1.
5. See MUMOLA, supra note 4, at 3 (showing that the number of state female prisoners
with minor children increased from 26,600 in 1991 to 48,500 in 1999).
6. See id. at 2 (showing that the number of federal female prisoners with minor chil-
dren increased from 2,900 in 1991 to 5,100 in 1999).
7. During a family visit at one of the women's prison facilities in Gatesville, Texas. I
observed a "good-bye" visit between a mother and her eighteen-month old daughter. A
"good-bye" visit is a final visit between a parent and a child prior to permanent separation.
By this time, the parent has already relinquished her rights or had her rights terminated by
the state. After the visit, with tears swelling in her eyes, the mother related to us that she
had sadly relinquished her rights to her child because she was going to be in prison for
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continually increased at the sight of families being separated for reasons
other than an allegation of abuse or neglect.' Many of the families I
worked with included incarcerated mothers and fathers, who inevitably
lost most or all contact with their children.' As a caseworker, it was my
job to ensure that the children continued to visit or maintain contact with
their parents, even when adverse factors surrounding visitation were pre-
sent. Setting up visits for parents in jail or prison not only took a great
deal of effort, but also took a significant amount of time and planning
since many of the facilities are located far from the counties where the
children reside."0 Prior to receiving a case involving an incarcerated par-
ent, I never realized how easy it was for the State to tear families apart,
yet so difficult for the State to put families back together.
awhile and had no family to help care for her daughter in the meantime. She said her
daughter would soon be adopted and that she would never be able to see her again.
8. In re D. T. is an example of a case in which a child was removed from a home for
reasons other than abuse and neglect. See In re D.T.. 34 S.W.3d 625 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2000. no pet. h.) (recognizing that the removal of the child was a result of the
mother's incarceration alone): see also Diana S. Young & Carrie J. Smith. When Monts are
Incarcerated: The Needs of Children. Mothers. and Caregivers. 81 FAIt It Si '": J. Co t.
TEMP. HUM. SERVS.. Mar. 1. 2000. available at 2000 WL 15451302 (noting the increase in
removal of children from their homes as a result of parental incarceration). See generall
Daan Braveman & Sarah Ramsey. When Welfare Ends: Removing Chldren front tite llome
for Poverty Alone, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 447. 462 (1997). Braveman and Ramsey suggest that
some families face removal of their children by the state as a result of their poverty alone.
See id. The authors also discuss the link between poverty and abuse and neglect. and sug-
gest that poverty is generally associated with conditions that could support removal of a
child. See id. at 461.
9. See Kathleen J. Block & Margaret J. Poithast. Girl Scouts Be'Yond Bars: Faciltating
Parent-Child Contact in Correctional Settings. 77 CILD WI-tJAR[: J. Poti "'. PR,\(. & PRO-
GRAM 561, 563 (1998) (noting the difficulty incarcerated women hase with maintaining
contact with their children): BARBARA BLOoMi & DAVIU Si iTliARI. N.i l't Cot'Nt-it o%
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY. WHY PUNISH Tf7HE CItlREN? A RI-Ai'PR\iAAt 01 lIIU CtiL
DREN OF INCARCERATED MOTHERS IN AMIERRCA 17 (1993) (indicating that incarcerated
mothers have little to no contact with their children, even when they retain custody); St-
SAN DELLER Ross. ET AL.. THE RIGHTS OF WOIEN: Tit- B,,sit ACLU Gt it)* 10 Wo-
MEN'S RIGHTS 235 (3d ed. 1993) (arguing that, in the absence of legislation, many
incarcerated women are deprived from having contact with their children). The words
"child" and "children" will be used interchangeably throughout this comment.
10. See generally Adela Beckerman. Charting a Course: Meeting the Challenge of Per-
manency Planning for Children iwith Incarcerated Mothers, 77 CIu WVARi: J. POt',
PRAC. & PROGRAM 513 (1998) (citing caseworkers' difficulty in helping children maintain
visitation with incarcerated parents). In addition, there are other factors that make visita-
tion problematic. For example, children and teenagers visiting their parents in prison facil-
ities are required to present a birth certificate or valid picture identification, sometimes
making it impossible to visit when the child or teenager has just entered foster care. When
children enter foster care. most of them enter without a birth certificate or any valid form
of identification. CPS must then order birth certificates or wait until a teenager enters
school in order to obtain a picture identification. This process often takes over a month.
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There are several grounds for the involuntary termination of parental
rights. 1 One of the primary reasons CPS moves toward termination is
because the child's caregiver is incarcerated. 2 The Texas Family Code
(TFC) provides that parental rights can be terminated on the basis of a
parent's incarceration for two or more years, so long as the court deems it
in the child's best interest. 3 The Texas statute predominantly affects sin-
gle parents who have complete care, custody and control of their chil-
dren, frequently causing a disparate impact on single mothers.1
4
Termination proceedings consist not only of going through the legal
process of termination, but also the emotionally-wrenching process of
helping both the children and the family deal with the effect of perma-
nent separation.15 Therefore, all of those involved are severely impacted
both physically and psychologically. The incarceration of a parent
caregiver, compounded by a subsequent termination of parental rights,
impacts the well-being of a child more severely than incarceration
alone.1 6
11. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000).
12. See id. at § 161.001(1)(Q) (allowing a court to order termination as a result of a
parent's incarceration for more than two years); see also The Legal Aid Society's Prisoners'
Rights Project, Testimony of the Legal Aid Society on the Effects of Incarceration on Fatni-
lies, at http://www.legal-aid.org/testimony5_30.htm (last visited May 30, 2000) (stating that
"[n]ot only does incarceration keep families apart, it can lead to the complete dissolution
of the family when the State terminates parental rights").
13. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(Q).
14. See MUMOLA, supra note 4, at 2. The report shows that only 43.8% of state male
inmates and 55.2% of federal male inmates lived with their children at the time of admis-
sion, compared with 64.3% of state and 84% of federal women inmates who resided with
their child at the time of admission. See id. See also Philip M. Genty, Termination of
Parental Rights among Prisoners: A National Perspective, in CHILDREN OF INCARCERA rm
PARENTS 167 (Katherine Gabel & Denise Johnston eds., 1995) (reporting that there has
been a historically disproportionate difference in the sentencing, time served, and custody
determination of women prisoners compared to their male counterparts); Denise Johnston,
The Care and Placement of Prisoners' Children, in CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS
104 (Katherine Gabel & Denise Johnston eds., 1995) (stating that approximately 75% of
incarcerated women and 50% of incarcerated men "lived with at least one minor child
prior to incarceration").
15. See Ana M. Novoa, Count the Brown Faces: Where Is the "Family" in the Family
Law of Child Protective Services, 1 SCHOLAR 5, 22 (1999) (citing Wendy Clockner Kates et
al., Whose Child Is This?: Assessment and Treatment of Children in Foster Care, 61 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 584 (1991)) (arguing that the harm resulting from removing a child
from their home can potentially be greater than "the harm for which they were removed
from their homes").
16. See Genty, supra note 14, at 167; see also Zachary Dowdy, Moms Behind Bars: As
Female Population Grows, So Does the Number of Displaced Children, Cui TRIB., Aug. 18,
1999, at B1 (reporting an increased likelihood of termination for incarcerated women);
Molly Weiser, Mothering from Behind Bars, PLAIN DEALER, May 21, 2000, at 4G (noting
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Although a difficult consequence of incarceration, a parent is generally
better able to deal with the idea of restricted visitation than with termina-
tion.17 Subsequently, the possibility that termination will occur because
of incarceration is a greater restriction on a parent's freedom to rear her
child than a parent's right to see her child.' For the parent, the termina-
tion of his or her parental rights is often seen as an additional sentence.9
This comment focuses on the parental rights of incarcerated women in
Texas and proposes that changes in CPS policy and court procedure be
made to ensure that these rights are protected. The purpose of this com-
ment is to demonstrate that the incarceration of a mother, for reasons
other than abusing or neglecting her child, is not enough to terminate her
parental rights, regardless of the length of her incarceration. This com-
ment will attempt to provide guidance to Texas courts and CPS
caseworkers when determining whether reasonable efforts have been
made in termination cases. In addition, this comment presents a step-by-
step approach to assessing the "reasonable efforts standard" imposed by
the Texas Family Code.
Part II explains the functions of CPS, and discusses its policies and pro-
cedures. Additionally, Part II examines CPS policy applicable to cases
involving the removal of a child and specifically discusses the steps that
must be taken in order to preserve the family. This section also looks at
the extended family's role in helping to maintain the mother-child rela-
tionship in termination cases. Part III analyzes statutory and case history
and examines the trend in Texas regarding the termination of parental
rights with regard to incarcerated parents. The comment then focuses on
the applicable Texas Family Code provision, and suggests that the provi-
sion allowing for termination of incarcerated parents' rights expands pro-
cedures set forth by CPS. Part III also looks at the effect of a mother's
that women in prison are more likely to lose their rights to their children than women who
are not in prison).
17. See Interview with Brenda. Member. Texas Inmate Families Association (TIFA),
in San Antonio, Tex. (Apr. 16. 2001) (on file with author), The names of those who were
interviewed for this comment were changed to protect their privacy. See also Gabnelle
deGroot, A Day in the Life: Four Women Share Their Stories of Life Behind Bars, CoR.
RECInONS TODAY, Dec. 1998, at 84 (reporting that the goal for most women in prison is to
reunite with their children upon their release).
18. See Interview with Brenda. supra note 17: deGroot. supra note 17.
19. See Deborah Ahrens, Note, Not iz Front of the Children: Prohibition on Child
Custody as Civil Branding for Criminal Activity. 75 N.Y.U. L Rt v. 737. 748 (2000) (stating
that the civil sanctioning of already convicted individuals is like receiving an "additional
criminal sentence"); see also Weiser, supra note 16 (writing that women receive a -double
punishment" upon their incarceration): Morales. supra note 3. at 5 (adding that children, as
well as women. are punished upon a mother's incarceration, since children are being
stripped of their mother's nurturing ability).
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incarceration on her child while attempting to weigh a mother's parental
rights against the best interest of the child and the family.
Part IV discusses the rights of incarcerated women and looks at how
these women have been treated from a historical viewpoint. It also com-
pares the impact of incarceration on mothers with fathers.
Part V presents a step-by-step approach to assessing the "reasonable
efforts standard" imposed by the Texas Family Code. The proposal incor-
porates applicable law, CPS policy, and related child protection issues to
present a framework for determining whether reasonable efforts to pre-
serve the family have been made in termination cases.
II. CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES
A division of the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Ser-
vices (the Department), Child Protective Services is the state agency
charged with investigating reports of child abuse and neglect."0 Child
protective services are "[s]pecialized casework services to neglected,
abused, or exploited children and their families."2" These services focus
on rehabilitating the home environment and preserving the family by ad-
dressing the family dynamics resulting in abuse or neglect.22
When a parent is arrested, the first contact with CPS occurs when
workers travel to the home of the arrested parent.23 Workers may either
supervise the transition of custody from the arrested parent to a parent or
20. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.301 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000); see also id.
§ 264.002(a)(1) (establishing that one of the Department's duties is to protect abused and
neglected children); AM. HUMANE ASS'N, HELPING IN CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES: A
COMPETENcY-BASED CASEWORK HANDBOOK 386 (Judee Filip et al. eds., 1992) (defining
Child Protective Services as providing "a specialized child welfare service ... [and] legally
responsible for investigating suspected cases of child abuse and neglect, and intervening in
confirmed cases").
21. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 264.201(a)(1)-(4) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000) (ex-
tending the Department's powers of prevention, alleviation, and reunification in their pro-
vision of services to families); see also AM. HUMANE ASS'N, supra note 20, at 4; DIANF
DEPANFILIS & MARSHA K. SALUS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN.
FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES: A GUIDE FOR
CASEWORKERS 25-38 (1992), available at http://www.calib.com/nccanch/pubs/usermanuals/
cpswork/cpswork.pdf (last visited May 15, 2001).
22. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 264.201(a)(1)-(4). This section of the code extends
to the Department the powers of prevention, alleviation, and reunification in their provi-
sion of services to families. See id. See also AM. HUMANE ASS'N, supra note 20, at 4;
DEPANFILIS & SALUS, supra note 21, at 25-38.
23. See Barbara Bloom, Public Policy and the Children of Incarcerated Parents, in
CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS 279 (Katherine Gabel & Denise Johnston eds..
1995).
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to a caregiver who resides with the children: however, if such placement
cannot be made, the children are then placed in CPS' care. 24
A. CPS Procedures
Through the investigative process, the Department examines the child,
assesses whether the s/he is at risk of harm, and determines whether pro-
tection is warranted by conducting an interview with the child and the
parent.' The investigation involves determining the type, cause, and ex-
tent of abuse, the parties involved (including the perpetrator and the vic-
tim), and the parent's ability to maintain a safe environment for the
child.26 In addition to conducting risk-assessments, CPS has the discre-
tion to provide family-preservation services to families in order to reduce
the likelihood of future abuse and neglect, which could cause the removal
of the child from the home.
Upon a finding of abuse, neglect, or a threat to the child's health and
safety, CPS can remove a child from the parent or caretaker's home prior
to obtaining a court order if presented with an emergency. 2' When not
presented with an emergency. the court must first make a general finding,
among other things, that there is an immediate danger to the health and
24. See id.
25. See TEX. FANi. CODE ANN. § 261.301(e). The Family Code states:
(e) As necessary to provide for the protection of the child, the department or de,tg-
nated agency shall determine:
(1) the nature, extent, and cause of the abuse or neglect:
(2) the identity of the person responsible for the abuse or neglect:
(3) the names and conditions of the other children in the home;
(4) an evaluation of the parents or persons responsible for the care of the child:
(5) the adequacy of the home environment:
(6) the relationship of the child to the persons responsible for the care. custody.
or welfare of the child: and
(7) all other pertinent data.
Id. See also 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 700.507 (1999) (outlining the information gathered
during the investigative process).
26. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.302 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000) (outlining the
requirements under which the Department must conduct its investigations); see also 40
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 700.507 (1999) (delineating the investigation process): DuP .ni TS &
SALUS, supra note 21. at 5-6 (1992): Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., Agencyv
Overview, at http://www.tdprs.state.tx.us./About. . .l_Reportsileg99htm/About.htm (last
visited Oct. 11. 2000).
27. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 264.002: 40 Tt:x. AD'IN. Cot- §§ 7U0.702-.703
(1999): see also Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs.. About PRS. at http:/ -wv.
tdprs.state.tx.uslAbout...1_Reportsfleg99htmlDefinitions.htm (last visited Oct. 11. 2uU1J).
28. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.104 (detailing the conditions that must be pre-
sent in order to remove a child for emergency reasons): see also id. at § 262.U01 (authonz-
ing the Department to file a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR)).
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safety of the child before issuing an order authorizing the state's posses-
sion of a child.29
Regardless of the method in which a child is removed from the home,
once removed, a child is either placed in an emergency shelter or a foster
home.3" CPS is charged with attempting to locate a relative upon a
child's removal, especially in situations where the parent, who is the pri-
mary caretaker of the child, is incarcerated.3' If CPS locates a relative,
they are required to conduct a background check and home study similar
to those required before an adoption.32 This requirement is not only re-
quired by the TFC, but also federally mandated by the Adoption and
Safe Families Act of 1997.3' Failure to pass the background check is an
automatic disqualification for placement of the child.34 Similarly, not
meeting the standards of the home study will exclude a family from being
seen as a possible placement for the child.
29. See id. § 262.102. CPS is also authorized to obtain a court order prior to taking the
appropriate actions to remove a child from the home. See id. In a case where removal is
not necessary prior to obtaining a court order, CPS legally removes the child from the care
of the parent by obtaining a court order granting the state temporary custody and restrict-
ing the parent's rights to visit the child. See id. Following the granting of the order, CPS
then takes action necessary to take possession of the child or children. See id. § 262.001 (a).
30. See TEX. DEP'T OF PROTECTIVE & REGULATORY SERVS., 2000 ANNUAL REoIU'o,
available at http://www.tdprs.state.tx.us/AboutPRS/PRSStatistics_&_Annual-Reports/
2000 (last visited Apr. 14, 2001) (indicating that children are placed in foster homes, emer-
gency shelters, or assessment centers when no relatives are available for placement after
the child's removal).
31. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.306(a)(5) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000) (estab-
lishing a requirement that the court evaluate the Department's progress in locating rela-
tives with whom the Department can place the child); see also Joseph R. Carrieri, Social
Worker's Legal Handbook, in CHILD ABUSE, NEGLECT AND THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM
2000: EFFECTIVE SOCIAL WORK AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM; THE ATrORNEY'S ROLE AND
RESPONSIBILITIES 120-21 (Practicing Law Inst. ed., 2000) (discussing a recent statute re-
quiring the court to look at relative placements before placing a child in foster care).
32. The TFC mandates that a social study of a potential adoptive family be conducted.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.003. The social study must include a complete assessment
of the home environment of the potential adoptive parent. See id. § 162.003(b). The TFC
also mandates that a criminal history report be conducted of any individual petitioning for
placement or adoption. Id. § 162.085. See also 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 700.520(b) (1999)
(allowing CPS to conduct a criminal background check for home studies); DEPANFILIS &
SALUS, supra note 21, at 56-58.
33. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 106, 111 Stat.
2115 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Safe Fam-
ilies Act] (applying the requirement for a criminal records check for prospective place-
ments); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.085; 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 700.520(b) (1999).
34. Failure to successfully pass a criminal history report may render you ineligible for
placement of a child in your home. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.085.
[Vol. 3:193
IN DEFENSE OF THE FAMILY
Soon after a child's removal from the home, CPS will establish a ser-
vice plan35 which is to be filed no later than the forty-fifth day after the
Department has been named Temporary Managing Conservator.3"
Along with the filing of the service plan, CPS establishes a Permanency
Plan for the child.37 A Permanency Plan is the overall goal for the child
and is included in the Permanency Progress Report, which states exactly
what the child's parents must do in order to regain custody of their
child.3" Included in the Report is a description of the permanency plan
for the child, including but not limited to termination, permanent foster
care or family reunification, and recommended actions necessary to en-
sure that the plan is met by a certain period of time.' "
CPS can also implement a departmental goal of termination."' In most
cases, however, the decision to move towards termination of a parent's
rights occurs in cases where the abuse or neglect of the child is deemed to
be severe or in cases when the parent or parents have had little or no
35. See id. § 263.102.
36. See id. § 263.101.
37. See id. § 263.102: 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODF § 700.1310 (1999): see also hi re J.N.R.,
982 S.W.2d 137.140 (Tex. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1998. no pet.) (providing that TDPRS
create a permanency plan soon after the parent's release from prison). A permanency plan
will be included in the service plan and will. for example. implement a goal of family
reunification and establish ways by which the parents can reach that goal for their family.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.302-5. Upon establishing a plan of ser'ice. a parent is
asked to successfully complete tasks that include: family therapy. individual therapy.
parenting classes, maintenance of full-time employment, and weekly visitation with their
child. See id. § 263.102(a)(9). This section allows for the inclusion of any other terms or
conditions necessary for successful completion of the service plan. See tL
38. The requirements of the permanency plan and permanency progress report are
outlined in the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FArt. CorDE ANN. §§ 263.3025. 303 (Vernon
1996 & Supp. 2000): see also 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 700.1310 (1999) (outlining the re-
quirements for permanency planning).
39. See TEX. FA, . CODE ANN. § 263.303. The code states in part:
(b) the permanency progress report must:
(1) recommend the suit be dismissed: or
(2) recommend that the suit continue, and:
(A) identify the date for dismissal of the suit under the chapter;.
(C) evaluate the parties* compliance with temporary orders and itth the ser-
vice plan:...
(E) describe the permanency plan for the child and recommend actions nec-
essary to ensure that a final order consistent with that permanency plan is
rendered before the date for dismissal of the suit: ...
Id.
40. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.102(a)(5)(B). The Department is required to
complete a service plan once it is appointed as managing conservator of a child. See ld.
§ 263.101. The service plan can include a statement by the Department establishing that
the plan's goal is termination of parental rights. See id. § 263.102(al(5)(B).
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involvement towards achievement of their permanency plan goals.4 ' The
parent is generally required to exceed the requirements established by
CPS in order to change their permanency plan goal.42 Generally, parents
involved in cases set for termination due to the extreme nature and cir-
cumstances of the abuse or neglect are not likely to be successful in hav-
ing that plan changed.
B. Public Policy
The Child Protective Services caseworker's primary responsibility is to
protect children while helping to stabilize and strengthen families.43
Moreover, intervention by a CPS caseworker is intended to focus on em-
powering families so that they can help themselves gain control over their
lives, while also ensuring that the family can provide a safe home to
which the child can return.44 In order for the caseworker to perform
these tasks effectively, casework must be performed in the context of the
family's cultural and social background.45 Therefore, the services a
caseworker provides are more effective when focused on the child, the
family, and the family's cultural norms.46
It is believed that protection of the family and maintenance of familial
relationships is "important to [the] physical and emotional development
of the child.",47 Unfortunately, most of the children who enter substitute
41. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001, 263.102(a). The list of reasons the State
can use to terminate parental rights includes lack of participation toward service plan
goals. See id. In a plan with the goal of termination of parental rights, the parents will still
be required to participate in certain programs such as therapy, visitation, and parenting
classes. See id. § 263.102(a)(7).
42. See generally id. § 263.303(b)(2)(C); see also Novoa, supra note 15, at 5.
43. See 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 700.1301 (1999); see also AM. HUMANE ASS'N, supra
note 20, at 20; DEPANFILIS & SALUS, supra note 21, at 5-6; TEX. DEP'T OF PROTE(-nVV &
REGULATORY SERVS., supra note 30, at 9-18 (introducing Child Protective Services as part
of the agency that focuses on the safety of children and on family stability).
44. See 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 700.1301 (1999); AM. HUMANE Ass'N, supra note 20,
at 30; TEX. DEP'T OF PROTECTIVE & REGULATORY SERVS., supra note 30, at 9-18; see also
Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., Description of Child Protective Services Pro-
gram, at http://www.tdprs.state.tx.uslAboutPRS/StatePlan3cpspOO.asp#familybased (last
visited May 16, 2001) (claiming that one of the Department's goals includes "promoting
integrity and stability of families" while making efforts to protect the child without remov-
ing him from the home).
45. See AM. HUMANE Ass'N, supra note 20, at 20; see also Beckerman, supra note 10,
at 521 (recommending that case management handbooks incorporate methods for
caseworkers to incorporate a family's cultural background into their case planning).
46. See AM. HUMANE Ass'N, supra note 20, at 30; see also Beckerman, supra note 10,
at 521.
47. See Braveman & Ramsey, supra note 8, at 451; see also Susan Greene et al., Cycles
of Pain: Risk Factors in the Lives of Incarcerated Mothers and Their Children, 80 PRIsoN J.
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care48 as a result of a parent's incarceration, end up in foster care if no
relatives or family friends are available for placement of the child.4" Yet,
placement of a child with relatives increases the likelihood that a child
will have continued contact with his mother5  and that an incarcerated
mother's rights will not be terminated. 5' Therefore, a family's plan of
service should solely incorporate a goal of relative placement. 2 Faced
with the notion that the number of children placed with grandparents
more than doubles upon a mother's incarceration without intervention by
CPS, the Department should act in accordance with this trend and make
relative placement a priority. 3 The reality, however, is that state agen-
cies will not usually place children in homes where family members have
3 (2000) (discussing the various negative effects that parental incarceration has on
children).
48. See 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 700.1301 (1999) (stating that substitute care is place-
ment anywhere outside of the child's home. including placement with relatives, a foster
family, an emergency shelter, or an assessment center): see also Tex. Dep't of Protective &
Regulatory Servs.. supra note 26.
49. See TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. § 263.306(a)(3)-(5) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000); Ellen
Barry et. al, Legal Issues for Prisoners with Children. an CiLDRt Of l 1., -R( AIrt -t
PARENTS 148-49 (Katherine Gabel & Denise Johnston eds.. 1995): Carrieri. supra note 31,
at 120: Julie A. Norman. Children of Prisoners in Foster (are. in CittnRtS (if l'€ ARCER
ITED PARENTS 124 (Katherine Gabel & Denise Johnston eds.. 1995); see also Tex. Dep't of
Protective & Regulatory Servs.. Description of Child Protective Services Program. supra
note 44 (affirming that children will be placed in foster care if no relative or family friend is
available to take the child).
50. See Cynthia Seymore, Children with Parents in Prison: Chihl Welfare Polic. Pro-
gram and Practice Issues. 27 CHILD WELFARE: J. oF Pot *'. PR,-C. & PR06RA-st 473
(1998). Seymore notes that incarcerated parents whose children are placed with relatives
often maintain contact with their children by phone calls and letters. See id. at 473.
Seymore notes, however. that relatives often have difficulty facilitating visits, and face
problems with affordability of transportation. See id. In addition, relatives are sometimes
unwilling to facilitate visits. See id.
51. See Bloom, supra note 3. at 26. But see CAItt-M!RI- Coxt -,. U.S. Dt-i,'it Jt s-
TICE, PUB. No. NCJ17858. THE WOMEN'S PRISON AssoCIAIlON: St-'IPORIIT, WoMI-N OF
FENDERS AND THEIR FA'MILIES 7 (1998) (noting that an incarcerated woman has a greater
chance of having her parental rights terminated).
52. See Barry et al., supra note 49. at 151 (Katherine Gabel & Denise Johnston eds..
1995): see also Young & Smith. supra note 8 (discussing a report stating that kinship care is
seen as a step towards family preservation rather than placement).
53. See Johnston. supra note 14. at 107. More than 50% of the children of incarcer-
ated mothers are placed with grandparents, more often the maternal grandmother, com-
pared with only 25% placed with fathers. See id. See also BLoOM & SILINHIARI, sulpra
note 9, at 16 (writing that most children separated from their mothers go live with their
grandmothers), Young & Smith. supra note 52 (noting that grandmothers often become the
kinship care providers when a mother is incarcerated).
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a history of criminal conduct54 despite the Department's goals of family
preservation.
III. THE LAW IN RELATION TO THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
The termination of a relationship between a parent and child is a final
and irrevocable process by which the state divests a parent of all legal
rights to their child.55 Termination is therefore considered the most se-
vere action brought by the State against a parent.56 Furthermore, the
termination of a parent's right to their child results in the revocation of a
parent's privileges, duties, and powers with respect to their child.57
A. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
In 1997, the federal government enacted the Adoption and Safe Fami-
lies Act of 1997 (ASFA) "to promote the adoption of children in foster
care" by creating certain financial incentives to states.58 ASFA modifies
the reasonable efforts standard required in child protection cases and
reduces the time a state agency has to reunify a child with his family.5
ASFA states that if a child is placed in foster care for fifteen of the last
54. See Denise Johnston & Katherine Gabel, Incarcerated Parents, in CHILDREN Or
INCARCERATED PARENTS 14 (Katherine Gabel & Denise Johnston eds., 1995).
55. See Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985); In re B.S.T., 977 S.W.2d 481,
483 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.). Holick asserts that termination is an
action that cannot be reversed. See Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20; see also Carrieri, supra note
31, at 78-79 (stating that termination severs a parent's legal rights and the bond between a
parent and child).
56. See In re B.S.T., 977 S.W.2d at 483 (noting that a termination action "is a drastic
remedy"); see also Ahrens, supra note 19, at 737 (stating that denying one "the ability to
maintain [a] relationship with their children [is] among the sternest penalties a society can
impose" on an individual).
57. See Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20; In re B.S.T., 977 S.W.2d at 483; see also Steven
Fleischer, Termination of Parental Rights: An Additional Sentence for Incarcerated Parents,
29 SETON HALL L. REv. 312, 312 (1998) (stating that "[t]ermination of parental rights has
severe ramifications in that it permanently severs the parent-child relationship, rendering
the parent ... unable to participate in the child's life").
58. Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also Phillip M. Genty, Permanency Planning in the
Context of Parental Incarceration: Legal Issues and Recommendations, 77 CHILD WELFARE:
J. OF POL'Y, PRAC. & PROGRAM 543, 551 (1998) (describing the changes ASFA made to
the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980).
59. See Safe Families Act, Title I § 103(a)(3)(E) (1997) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also Beckerman, supra note 10, at 514-16 (describing the
effects that the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 has on permanency planning time-
lines); Genty, supra note 58, at 551-52 (discussing the details of the ASFA); Paula Dressel
et al., Mothers Behind Bars, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Dec. 1998, at 90 (stating that the short-
ening of time a state has to reunify a child with his family almost certainly results in perma-
nent separation). ASFA amended 42 U.S.C. § 675(a)(3)(E) in the following manner:
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twenty-two months, the state shall file a petition for termination of the
parental rights.60 Although ASFA appears strict on its face, it provides
the following limited exceptions: the state has the discretion to not file
the petition if (1) the child is in the care of a relative, (2) the state has
documented a compelling reason for why the termination would not be in
the best interest of the child, or (3) the state has not provided a sufficient
amount of time for the parent's successful completion of the service
plan.6' However, in a situation where a parent is incarcerated for at least
fifteen months, the state has the discretion to file a petition for termina-
tion, even if it is determined that reasonable efforts to preserve the family
have not been made.62
B. Statutory Provisions in Texas
As a result of the adoption of ASFA, the Texas Family Code permits
termination of parental rights upon a parent's incarceration for a specific
period of time63 and allows for termination even when the reason for
incarceration did not involve abuse or neglect of a child. '
(E) in the case of a child who has been in foster care under the responsibilty of the
State for 15 of the most recent 22 months, or. if a court of competent jurtsdiction has
determined a child to be an abandoned infant.. .the State shall file a petitton to termi-
nate the parental rights of the child's parents... and. concurrently, to identify. recruit.
process, and approve a qualified family for an adoption.
Id
60. See Safe Families Act. § 103(a)(3)(E) (1997) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.): see also Judge Ernestine S. Gray. The Adoption and Sa' Faindhes
Act of 1997: Confronting an American Tragedy. 46 LA. B-J. 477 (1999) (outlining the van-
ous requirements of ASFA): Dowdy. supra note 16. at 8 (describing the fifteen month time
limit required by the ASFA).
61. See Safe Families Act. § 103(a)(3)(E)(i)-(iii).
62. See Safe Families Act. § 103(a)(b)(E): see also Gray. supra note 60. at 4s (listming
the factors for which the reasonable efforts requirement does not apply); Shawn L Ray-
mond, Note, Where are the Reasonable Efforts to Enforce the Reasonable Efforts Require-
ment? Monitoring State Compliance Under the Adoption Assistance and (hild Welfare Act
of 1980, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1235. 1259-60 (1999) (discussing situations in which the state does
not have to make reasonable efforts to return a child to his or her home).
63. In Texas. the period is two or more years. See Tu x. F,,i ('t A%'.
§ 161.001(1)(Q) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000). Under ASFA. termination can begin after
the fifteenth month from the child's placement in foster care or from the initial filing of the
petition. See Safe Families Act. § 103(a)(3)(E): see also Robert M. Gordon. Driftmng
Through Byzantium: The Promise and Faihre of the Adoption and Safe Finihes Act of
1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637. 658 (1999) (listing greater numbers of visits between an incar-
cerated parent and child when the child is placed with a relative).
64. See Safe Families Act. § 103(a)(3)(E). Note the use of -or" between the different
elements available to file a petition for termination. See id. For example. it a woman
receives a sentence of three years in prison for committing check fraud and cannot make
arrangements for placement of her child prior to detention, she will face intervention by
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In most states, termination of a parent's rights is deemed necessary
only when the parent endangers the child so as to threaten or effect the
child's well being or when termination is believed to be in the best inter-
est of the child.65 However, section 161.001(1)(Q) of the Texas Family
Code provides for termination of parental rights in situations where a
parent, either a mother or a father, is sentenced to prison for two or more
years.66 The statute states that the court may order termination if it finds,
by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent "knowingly engaged in
criminal conduct that has resulted in the parent's conviction of an offense
and confinement or imprisonment and inability to care for the child for
not less than two years."67 A simple conviction will not result in termina-
tion of parental rights;68 rather, the parent must be given a sentence that
includes incarceration.69
CPS, who will place her child in foster care. See, e.g., In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2000, no pet. h.).
65. The Boyd court defined 'to endanger' as "jeopardiz[ing] the child or expos[ing]
the child to loss or injury." See Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Boyd 727 S.W.2d 531, 533
(Tex. 1987); see also In re K.C.M., 4 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999,
pet. denied) (defining endanger as "expos[ing] the child to loss or injury or to jeopardize"
the child's safety). Accord In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (writ
of error denied, Jan. 31, 1997); In re D.E.G., No. 01-99-00143-CV, 2000 WL 145109 (Tex.
App.-Houston [lst Dist.] Feb. 10, 2000, n.w.h.) (not designated for publication).
66. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(Q) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000). This
section of the Texas Family Code was created as a result of the enactment of the Adoption
and Safe Families Act of 1997. See Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, I
§ 101(a)(15)(B), 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.) (establishing that reasonable efforts shall be made on the part of the Department
to preserve and reunify families); Dowdy, supra note 16. The Adoption and Safe Families
Act of 1997 provides federal funding to states who comply with its requirements. See id.
Massachusetts, for example, was set to receive approximately 100 million dollars in federal
aid as a result of its compliance with the ASFA. See id.
67. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001.
68. Note the use of the word "and" between parts (i) and (ii) signifies that both need
to be present in order to allow termination. Therefore, a parent who commits any offense
against anyone other than their child, and serves no prison state jail sentence, can still
maintain parental rights over their child. In addition, if a parent is convicted of an offense
and incarcerated for less than two years, the parent is still able to maintain their parental
rights over their child as long as they meet the requirements outlined in the service plan
submitted by CPS if the Department intervenes.
69. Compare TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(Q) (establishing that there be a
conviction and incarceration), with TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(L) (outlining the
various convictions for which parent's rights can be terminated); see also Carrieri, supra
note 31, at 172-73 (stating that loss of custody occurs upon incarceration as a result of a
felony conviction).
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One of the biggest issues affecting incarcerated parents' ability to reu-
nite with their children is the term for which they are sentenced.7" Texas
has adopted the Permanency Planning Initiative, which resulted in the
implementation of a timeline, at the end of which a child must have a
permanent living arrangement.71 Upon intervention by CPS, the child's
permanency plan may require termination of parental rights unless CPS
can locate a relative for placement.7 2 However, the placement of a child
with a relative or family friend is dependent upon the successful comple-
tion of a home study73 and a favorable background check." Therefore,
those that are most affected by the statute are parents who do not have
friends or relatives willing or able to take custody of their children."
Similarly, parents who have family or friends willing to take the child, but
whose background or home environment does not fall within the stan-
70. See Norman. supra note 49. at 125-26. The longer a parent is incarcerated, the
longer the disruption for the child and the more difficult it will be to have the state return
the child home. See id. at 126: see also Dowdy. supra note 16. at 8 (stating that the longer
women remain in prison, the greater chance they have of losing their children); Tex. Dep't
of Protective & Regulatory Servs.. supra note 44.
71. See TEX. FANi. CODE ANN. § 263.401(a) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000) (codifying
the final order requirement upon reaching the one year deadline): see also TLx. Dtui'r oF
PROTECTIVE & REGULATORY SERVS.. supra note 30. at 11 (outlining the Texas Perma-
nency Planning Initiative's goal): Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., supra note
44 (listing the various types of permanency plan goals).
72. See TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. § 263.006 (providing that the court inform the parents
that their rights could be subject to termination if the child cannot return to a safe environ-
ment): see also Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs, supra note 44 (describing
CPS' options when a non-custodial parent or relative is not found or is unable to care for
the child).
73. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 107.051-.052. These sections provide the court with
the power to appoint the Department or another person to conduct a social study of an
individual requesting possession of a child. See id. The TFC states that the study must
contain the child's physical, sexual. and/or emotional history. See i, § 107.052(b).
74. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.052 (stating that the study should comply with
the Department's standards, guidelines and procedures): see also 40 Ttix. ADtn\. Coat
§ 700.520(b) (1999) (providing CPS with the authority to request a criminal background
check from the Texas Department of Public Safety or local law enforcement). The Depart-
ment's policy requires that a criminal background check be conducted on ever' individual
requesting possession of a child. See id. § 700.520(b)(3).
75. See Investigative Reports. Women in Prison (A & E television broadcast. Mar. 26.
2001) (on file with author). Kristie Camp. incarcerated at the Central California Women's
Facility in Madero, California. is serving time for murdering her physically abusive hus-
band. See id. When asked how often she saw her children. Ms. Camp responded: -I don't
get to see them at all because they were awarded to my mother-in-law who adopted them
since I didn't have family for them to go to." Id.
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dards set forth by the Department, will not be certified as a possible
placement.76
While the Texas statute greatly affects single parents that have com-
plete care, custody, and control of their children, it also has a profound
effect on the future of the child and the family unit as a whole.77 Further-
more, the statute impacts women who do not have an extended family or
network of friends willing or able to intervene before the state removes
the child from the home, placing the child in foster care.78 Although the
Texas Administrative Code requires CPS to locate relatives for place-
ment, CPS is not required to do so under the TFC. 79 Therefore, in an
attempt to "speed-up" the process, CPS can defer to section
161.001(1)(Q) and use it as a tool for immediately requesting termina-
tion, thereby circumventing the need to locate an alternative placement."
The repercussions are profound-if a parent cannot make arrangements
for placement of their child with a relative or family friend prior to being
incarcerated, CPS can remove that child and immediately proceed to-
wards termination of parental rights.8"
1. Interpretation of the Statute by Texas Courts
Some courts agree that the overall effect of section 161.001(1)(Q)2 is
too severe and that imprisonment should not be the only factor used in
electing to terminate a parent's rights.83 Nevertheless, termination most
often occurs when women are incarcerated for a significant period of
time.84 The recent trend in Texas courts has been to expand the stan-
76. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.052(b) (stating that the study should comply with
the Department's standards, guidelines and procedures).
77. See id. § 263.006 (providing that the court shall warn parents of the possibility of
termination if the parents are unable to provide a safe environment for the child).
78. See, e.g., 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 700.1313 (1999) (stating that permanent place-
ment with relatives will occur if there is a relative or friend "willing and able to (A) protect
the child; (B) assume responsibility for the child's care and upbringing; and (C) either
adopt the child or accept permanent managing conservatorship"); see also MUMOLA, supra
note 4, at 3 (citing that 2.4% of state and 1.3% of federal inmates had children placed in a
foster home or other similar placement).
79. Compare TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000), with 40 TEx. AI-
MIN. CODE §§ 700.1310, .1313 (1999).
80. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(Q).
81. See id.; see also 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 700.1310, .1313 (1999). Since the codes
conflict, it is therefore up to the assistant district attorney, supervisor, or caseworker to
determine how the case will proceed. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (Sampson &
Tindall 2000) (explaining the ambiguity of Subsection (1)(Q) of the Code in the comment).
82. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(Q) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000).
83. See In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d. 625, 633-34 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, no pet. h.).
84. See Bloom, supra note 3, at 26; see also Dowdy, supra note 16 (reporting that
women with longer prison sentences stand a greater chance of losing their children); but
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dards of proof and evidence in favor of the parent when the case involves
the involuntary termination of a parent-child relationship." In addition,
some courts have begun to pave the way so that certain factors, other
than incarceration, can be considered prior to the termination of the par-
ent-child relationship.86 The consensus among courts is that mere incar-
ceration of a parent alone should not constitute the determinate factor
terminating the parent-child relationship."7
In Southerland v. Thigpen.' the Fifth Circuit noted that an incarcer-
ated woman does not lose all of her "protected liberty interests "" simply
because of her incarceration.' Other courts support this notion and take
the Southerland analysis one step further. Recent court decisions insist
upon evidence of other wrong or criminal behavior, aside from the par-
ent's incarceration, that supports termination.' As a result, several
courts have held that imprisonment alone is not sufficient to terminate -or
see The Associated Press. Prison Term Ruled Irrelevant in Sevcring Parental Rights, Tt'
SON CITIzEN, Apr. 6, 2000, at 7C (reporting on a recently decided case that expressly stated
"there is no specific prison term at which an inmate's parental rights must be severed").
85. See Coming v. Tex. Dep't. of Protective and Regulator Ses.. No. U3-994JUU09-
CV. 1999 WL 795220, at 2 (Tex. App.-Austin Oct. 7. 1999. no pet. h.) (not designated for
publication) (adhering to the clear and convincing standard of evidence in termination
cases); In re M.D.S.. 1 S.W.3d 190. 197 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999. no pet.) (holding that
termination requires incarceration plus evidence of any conduct on the part of the parent
that has endangered the health and safety of the child): In re B.S.T. 977 S.W.2d 481. 483
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998. no pet.) (applying the clear and convincing stan-
dard of proof to termination cases).
86. See, e.g., Tex. Dep't. of Human Servs. v. Boyd. 727 S.W.2d 531. 533 (Tex. 1987).
87. See id.: see also In re D.T.. 34 S.W.3d 625. 633 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000. no
pet. h.) (supporting the notion that more than a single act is needed to support termination
of a parent-child relationship): Crawford v. Crawford. 569 S.W.2d 505 (1978) (finding that
incarceration alone is not sufficient to establish endangerment of a child's physical or emo-
tional well-being).
88. 784 F.2d 713. 716 (5th Cir. 1986). The court revealed that an incarcerated wo-
man's right to see her child is outweighed by the prison system's need to maintain order.
See id. at 716. However, the Southerland court did not discuss the right of a woman to
maintain her parental rights to her child. See id.
89. Id. at 715.
90. See id. at 716.
91. See Boyd. 727 S.W. 2d 531: In re D.T.. 34 S.W.3d 625 (holding that abandonment
cannot be inferred from incarceration alone): In re M.D.S.. 1 S.W.3d 190. 199 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1999. no pet.) (holding that termination requires incarceration plus evidence of
any conduct on the part of the parent that has endangered the health and safety of the
child): In re S.D.H.. 591 S.W.2d 637. 638 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979. no wTit) (holding
that imprisonment does not constitute abandonment): H.WJ. v. State Dep't of Pub. Wel.
fare. 543 S.W.2d 9. 11 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976. no writ) (holding that impnson-
ment is not considered abandonment).
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incarcerated mother's parental rights based on the determination that she
had abandoned her child.92
In Texas Dep't of Human Services v. Boyd,9 3 the Texas Supreme Court
held that a parent's misconduct resulting in incarceration is an act of en-
dangerment to the child and should be considered in a termination pro-
ceeding. 94 Upon consideration of incarceration, if a court finds that the
evidence does not support a course of conduct that places the child in
danger, then the court cannot reasonably find that termination is appro-
priate.95 Nevertheless, some courts believe that if the evidence, including
the imprisonment of a parent, shows a course of conduct that endangers
the child's physical or emotional well being, termination is an appropriate
finding.96
Other courts argue that incarceration alone does not constitute "con-
duct that endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child."9 7
These courts have instead held that if the trier of fact finds that "impris-
onment was based upon a certain type of voluntary, deliberate, and con-
scious course of conduct, then such conduct endangers the emotional
well-being of the child."9 8 Accordingly, the Boyd court stated that while
proof of actual injury was not necessary, endangerment could simply
mean to jeopardize. Thus, the Boyd court concluded that imprisonment
is still a factor in determining endangerment. 99
In response, some courts have determined that the trier of fact should
only consider imprisonment as additional evidence. 00 As a result, many
92. See In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d at 632 (holding that abandonment cannot be inferred
from incarceration alone); In re M.D.S., 1 S.W.3d at 199 (holding that imprisonment alone
does not constitute child endangerment); In re S.D.H., 591 S.W.2d at 638 (holding that
imprisonment does not rise to the level of abandonment); H.W.J., 543 S.W.2d at 11 (hold-
ing that merely because a person is imprisoned does not mean that they have abandoned
their child).
93. 727 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. 1987).
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. See In re D.E.G., No. 01-99-00143-CV, 2000 WL 145109 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist
Dist.] Feb. 10, 2000, n.w.h.) (not designated for publication); In re M.D.S., 1 S.W.3d 190; In
re J.N.R., 982 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Tex. App. -Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
97. See Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; see also In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625. The In re D.T.
court found that a parent's imprisonment as a result of writing bad checks did not rise to
the level of conduct that endangered a child. See id.
98. In re K.M.M., 993 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1999); see, e.g., In re
J.N.R., 982 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet. h.); In re Guillory,
618 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ).
99. See Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533.
100. See, e.g., Corning v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., No. 03-99-
00009-CV, 1999 WL 795220, at 3 (Tex. App.-Austin Oct. 7, 1999, no pet. h.) (not desig-
nated for publication).
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courts consistently hold that imprisonment alone should not be the only
factor in terminating parental rights based on abandonment."0
Presently, the Texas Supreme Court has provided little guidance to the
lower courts regarding what other factors to consider, besides incarcera-
tion, when determining whether or not to terminate parental rights." 2
Weighing a parent's incarceration status °3 with the best interest factors
established in Holley v. Adans 10 4 should result in a balanced decision for
the family. The Holley factors include:
(A) desires of the child: (B) the emotional and physical needs of the
child now and in the future; (C) the emotional and physical danger to
the child now and in the future: (D) the parental abilities of the indi-
viduals seeking custody: (E) the programs available to assist these
individuals to promote the best interest of the child: (F) the plans for
the child by these individuals or the agency seeking custody; (G) the
stability of the home or proposed placement: (H) the acts or omis-
sions of the parent which may indicate that the parent-child relation-
ship is not a proper one; and (I) any excuse for the acts or omissions
of the parent.10 5
Generally, most courts do not recognize that incarcerated parents
maintain a constitutional right to raising their children."' In fact, many
courts believe that the exercise of certain constitutional rights, including
the rearing of a child, is incompatible with incarceration."' 7 Moreover,
courts suggest that a parent's right to rear his or her child should also be
restricted in light of the penal system's goals and policies."1  Accord-
ingly, the Fifth Circuit supported the separation of a prisoner from his or
her child, a restriction otherwise deemed protected, because it believed
that separation is compatible with incarceration and with the mainte-
nance of legitimate penalogical concerns. t° 9
101. See, e.g., id.: Jordan v. Hancock. 508 S.W.2d 878. 881 (Tex. App.-Houston 114th
Dist.] 1974. no writ).
102. See In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625. 637 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, no pet. h.),
103. The courts can consider, for example, length of incarceration, reason for incar-
ceration, and the parent's progress while in the facility.
104. 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1976).
105. Id. at 371-72.
106. See, e.g.. Southerland v. Thigpen. 784 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 198b): se also Pender-
grass v. Toombs. 546 P.2d 1103, 1104 (Or. App. 1976) (holding that an inmate's right to
rear the child is a right that is incompatible with incarceration).
107. See, e.g., Pendergrass. 546 P.2d at 1103-1104.
108. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984): see also Pell v. Procumer. 417 U.S.
817 (1974) (recognizing that "lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal
or limitation of many privileges and rights").
109. See Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450. 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1989): Southerland, 784
F.2d at 716.
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2. The Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard
The Supreme Court of the United States has historically recognized
that parents have a constitutional right to rear their child and to make
decisions in matters of family relationships. 1 ' Moreover, the Court has
held that such a right is a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.1"' Similarly, Texas courts
have held that "[tihe natural right existing between parents and their chil-
dren is of constitutional dimensions. ' 12 As a result, the degree of proof
required in termination cases is clear and convincing evidence, t 13 which is
met when the trier of fact arrives at "a firm belief or conviction as to the
truth of the allegations" asserted."' In fact, Texas courts have stated that
more than a scintilla of evidence must be brought forth to prove an en-
dangering course of conduct on the part of the parent. 1 5 Accordingly,
some courts have determined that in order to justify termination, a
110. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (noting a parent's freedom to
direct the upbringing of their children is constitutionally protected); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (supporting the protection of a parent's right to bring up their chil-
dren); see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973) (holding that women have a constitution-
ally protected right to make decisions regarding family matters); Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688-89 (1977) (holding a statute unconstitutional because it prohibited
distribution and advertisement of non-prescription contraceptives).
111. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (holding that the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands more than a preponderance of the
evidence in termination cases); Roe, 410 U.S. 959 (determining that the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of liberty encompasses a woman's right to terminate her preg-
nancy); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (expanding the notion that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the integrity of the family unit);
Pierce, 268 U.S. 510 (supporting a parent's right to direct the upbringing of their children);
Meyer, 262 U.S. 390 (establishing the doctrine that a parent's right to rear their child is
protected by the Constitution); Doe v. Pub. Health Trust, 696 F.2d 901, 909 (11 th Cir. 1983)
(holding that parental rights are protected by the Constitution); Dike v. School Board, 650
F.2d 783, 786 n.1 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the Constitution provides protection for
parental rights); Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985) (holding that parents' rights
are constitutionally protected).
112. In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 194-95 (Tex. 1994); In re B.S.T., 977 S.W.2d 481,483
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998); see also Holick, 685 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. 1985).
113. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769-70; see also In re B.S.T., 977 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998) (requiring the clear and convincing standard of evidence
in termination cases); Fleisher, supra note 57, at 313 (interpreting the court's discussion of
the clear and convincing standard requirement established in Santosky v. Kramer).
114. See TEx. FAM. CODE Arm. § 101.007 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000); see also In re
G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980) (establishing support for the Texas Family Code's
clear and convincing standard); In re B.S.T., 977 S.W.2d at 484 (supporting Texas' clear and
convincing standard discussed by the In re G.M. court).
115. See In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 631-32 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, no pet. h.)
(requiring that factually sufficient evidence be produced to support a finding that a parent
endangered a child); see also In re D.L.N., 958 S.W.2d 934, 939 (Tex. App.-NVaco 1997)
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heightened level of proof such as "clear and convincing evidence" should
be required.1 16 The level of evidence required to terminate such a right
must therefore rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence, a stan-
dard required by due process."'
Furthermore, courts still agree that since a constitutional right is in-
volved, termination proceedings should be strictly scrutinized."' These
and other courts have firmly held that strict scrutiny should be applied in
favor of the parent when determining cases involving involuntary termi-
nation statutes.'1 9
The Texas Supreme Court, however, has not provided any guidance
regarding the varying standard of proof applicable to trial and appellate
courts when terminating parental rights. Currently, the standard of proof
in trial courts is the clear and convincing standard established by the
United States Supreme Court in Santoskv v. Kramer.'2' The Santosky
Court held that a state must prove the allegations for termination by clear
and convincing evidence, as required by due process, before the state may
completely sever the parent-child relationship.' 2 ' However, many Texas
appellate courts only apply the preponderance of the evidence standard,
which requires a less stringent degree of proof than the one required at
the trial level.1 22 For example, the court in lI re D.L.N.' noted that
(declaring that evidence legally and factually sufficient to support termination of parental
rights is needed).
116. See In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d at 629-30: Corning v. Tex. Dep't of Protectve & Regu-
latory Servs.. No. 03-99-00009-CV. 1999 WL 795220 (Tex. App.-Austin Oct. 7. 1999. no
pet. h.) (not designated for publication): Il re B.S.T.. 977 S.W. 2d 481 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
117. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000): see also In re
K.C.M.. 4 S.W.3d 392. 395 (Tex. 1999) (restating the clear and convincing standard in the
TFC).
118. See Corning v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Sers., No. 03-99-4JU09-
CV. 1999 Tex. App. WL 795220 (Tex. App.-Austin Oct. 7. 1999, no pet. h.) (not desig-
nated for publication) (adhering to the clear and convincing standard of evidence in termi-
nation cases): In re M.D.S.. 1 S.W.3d 190. 197 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999. no pet.) (stating
that termination cases should be strictly scrutinized and that the clear and convincing stan-
dard of proof apply): In re B.S.T.. 977 S.W.2d at 484 (applying the clear and convincing
standard to termination cases).
119. See In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d at 630 (indicating the need for strictly construing termi-
nation statutes in favor of the parent): see also In re K.C.M., 4 S.W.3d at 395 (stating that
the presumption in termination cases is to maintain the parent-child relationship); In re
C.D. 962 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) (stating that termination
proceedings should be strictly scrutinized).
120. 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982).
121. See id.
122. See Spurlock v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Seras., 904 S.W.2d 152.
155-56 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ denied): it re W.S.. 899 S.W.2d 772. 776 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ): In re J.F.. 888 S.W.2d 140. 141 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1994.
2001]
THE SCHOLAR
since the Texas Supreme Court had not directly addressed this issue, it
would continue to apply the preponderance of the evidence standard in
involuntary termination cases. 124 The court also opposed the idea that it
should apply the clear and convincing standard simply because the trial
courts were directed to do so. l2 5
This form of judicial activism is disturbing, since the United States Su-
preme Court has already established that the termination of a parent-
child relationship involves constitutional protections and strict eviden-
tiary standards.12 6 It would be constitutionally reasonable for state ap-
pellate courts to also apply the clear and convincing standard when
considering the termination of a recognized constitutional right. As re-
quired by the Santosky court, all state trial and appellate courts should
apply the clear and convincing evidentiary standard to cases in which the
state is seeking termination of parental rights. 127
3. The Reasonable Efforts Standard
The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980128 established
that CPS must demonstrate reasonable efforts have been made to pre-
serve the family before the court can certify the termination of the par-
ent-child relationship.12 9 At least twenty-four states in the United States
have legislation outlining the procedures courts must follow in determin-
ing whether reasonable efforts have been made in cases involving a cus-
tody determination.13
no writ); Oadra v. Stegall, 871 S.W.2d 882, 892 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1994, no
writ); D.O. v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 851 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1993, no writ).
123. 958 S.W.2d 934, 940 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997).
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (establishing constitutional
protections for matters regarding the family). Accord Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168
(1973) (holding that determinations regarding the family invoke constitutional protections
under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); see generally Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (affording constitutional protections to cases involving termi-
nation of parental rights); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (implicating constitutional
protections of the parent-child relationship).
127. See Santosky, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
128. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat.
500 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Child Wel-
fare Act].
129. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1994); Child Welfare Act, § 471 (1980) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also AM. HUMANE Ass'N, supra note 20. at
4 (outlining the general intent of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980).
130. See Alice C. Shatton, Making Reasonable Efforts in Child Abuse and Neglect
Cases: Ten Years Later, 26 CAL. W. L. REV. 223, 234 (1989-90). California, Florida, Geor-
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In Texas, CPS has established a policy holding that "'reasonable efforts"
are attempts "to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the
child.""' However, there are currently no clear guidelines to help deter-
mine exactly when reasonable efforts are made or achieved. Balanced
with determining the child's best interest, reasonable efforts must be es-
tablished by the Department and then certified by the court prior to the
removal of the child from the home. 32 The determination of the court
with regard to reasonable efforts, both prior to and after removal, is
made on a case-by-case basis and is not guided by any established
principles. 133
As evidenced by Suter v. Artist M.,131 many courts continue to sidestep
the fact that there is no clear definition for reasonable efforts.'" The
Suter court noted that. at the time the case was heard, there was "'no...
statutory guidance ... as to how 'reasonable efforts' are to be mea-
sured."'1 36 However, the court failed to clarify what is required to meet
this standard. Instead, the court simply held that the term reasonable
efforts did not confer upon a private individual the right to bring forth a
cause of action against the state for not making reasonable efforts."'
4. The Rights of the Child and the Best Interest Standard
A child often suffers severe trauma and emotional turmoil when re-
moved from his or her home: therefore, efforts to place a child with fam-
ily after removal should be a priority.' Similarly, a child who is
gia, Illinois. Indiana. Iowa. Kansas. Louisiana, Minnesota. Massachusetts. Mississippi. Mts-
souri, Nevada, New Mexico. New York. Ohio. Oklahoma. Oregon. qirgima. Washington.
and Wisconsin implemented statutory reasonable effort schemes by 1990. St't' id. at 2-4
n.37-38.
131. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs.. supra note 44; see also 42 U S.C.
§ 671(a)(15) (1994): ANI. HutIANE Ass'N. supra note 20. at 321.
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1994): Ti x. FA,,,. Cot~i: ANN. § 262.113(l) (Vernon
1996 & Supp. 2000): ANi. HtINMANE Ass'N. supra note 20, at 325 (indicating that it is the
Department's duty to make reasonable efforts to preserve the family, while it is the court's
duty to determine whether the Department's efforts were reasonable).
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1994): TEX. FAst. CODL ANN. §§ 262.101(2)..201(3);
(Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000): see also AmI. H'MANE Ass'N, supra note 20, at 325. The
textbook, a book that is provided to every caseworker during training, does not proxide
caseworkers with a clear understanding of reasonable efforts. See Am. Ht %I .-,t Avs".
supra note 20. This is an example of the lack of a strict definition for reasonable efforts
within the Department.
134. 503 U.S. 347 (1992).
135. See id. at 359-64.
136. Id. at 360.
137. See id. at 364.
138. See Braveman & Ramsey. supra note 8. at 453-54 (quoting congresstonal testi-
mony given by The Association for Children of New Jersey regarding the State's reasona-
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separated from his or her mother because of her incarceration also suffers
emotionally.1 39 A child's bond with a mother does not disappear as a
result of the mother's incarceration, and therefore, this bond must be fos-
tered, not terminated. 4 ° Given that it is important to preserve the family
and to primarily attempt to place children with relatives or family friends,
children who are placed in foster care should be ensured that contact with
their mother will continue, not because it is what the parent is entitled to,
but because continued contact and visitation with the parent is in the best
interest of the child. 1
41
In addition to determining whether a parent has committed one of the
acts outlined in section 161.001(1) of the Texas Family Code,W42 a court
has the duty to determine, prior to termination of a parent's rights,
whether the termination of the relationship is in the child's best inter-
est.143 Although the best interest standard allows a court to consider pre-
sumptions against an incarcerated parent maintaining custody of a
child, 14 4 the standard is an inseparable and necessary part of custody de-
terminations. In order to determine whether termination of the parent-
child relationship is in the child's best interest, the court should consider
the Holley factors individually in addition to the factors established by
the TFC.145
ble efforts requirement). But see TEX. DEP'T OF PROTECniVE & REGULATORY SEIvs.,
supra note 30 (citing relative placement as only one of the few alternatives for placement).
139. See Christina J. Kampfner, Post Traumatic Stress Reactions in Children of Impris-
oned Mothers, in CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTs 89 (Katherine Gabel & Denise
Johnston eds., 1995); see also Young & Smith, supra note 8 (stating that children of incar-
cerated women face similar effects as children whose parent has passed away); Morales,
supra note 3, at 5 (discussing the various negative effects of a mother's incarceration on
children).
140. See Kampfner, supra note 139, at 98-99.
141. See Norman, supra note 49, at 126; see also Young & Smith, supra note 8 (citing a
study conducted by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency that caregivers "be-
lieved that contact with the incarcerated mother [was] helpful to the child").
142. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000); see also In
re M.D.S., 1 S.W.3d 190, 197 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet.) (citing the general re-
quirements for termination outlined in the Texas Family Code).
143. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(2) (delineating the best interest of the child
standard).
144. See Ahrens, supra note 19, at 774.
145. See In re M.D.S., 1 S.W.3d at 199-200 (citing Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367,
371-72 (Tex. 1976)). Both courts outline the different things a court should consider when
determining the best interest of the child. See id. The factors currently outlined in the TFC
include:
(1) the child's age and physical and mental vulnerabilities;
(2) the frequency and nature of out-of-home placements;
(3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child:
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Some courts presume that the child's best interest is served by main-
taining the parent-child relationship with the child's natural parent.' "
Furthermore, courts have relied on balancing the totality of the circum-
stances and evidence with the factors set out in Hollev in determining
whether or not to terminate a parent's rights.' In fact, the In re K.C.M.
(4) whether the child has been the victim of repeated harm after the initial re-
port and intervention by the department or other agency.
(5) whether the child is fearful of living in or returning to the child's home,
(6) the results of psychiatric. psychological, or developmental evaluations of the
child, the child's parents, other family members, or others who have access to the
child's home:
(7) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child's fam-
ily or others who have access to the child's home:
(8) whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child's family or others
who have access to the child's home:
(9) whether the perpetrator of the harm to the child is identified;
(10) the willingness and ability of the child's family to seek out. accept. and com-
plete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate
agency's close supervision:
(11) the willingness and ability of the child's family to effect positie environmen-
tal and personal changes within a reasonable period of time:
(12) whether the child's family demonstrates adequate parenting skills, including
providing the child and other children under the family's care with:
(A) minimally adequate health and nutritional care:
(B) care, nurturance, and appropriate discipline consistent with the child's
physical and psychological development:
(C) guidance and supervision consistent with the child's safety;
(D) a safe physical home environment:
(E) protection from repeated exposure to violence even though the % iolence
may not be directed at the child: and
(F) an understanding of the child's needs and capabilities: and
(13) whether an adequate social support system consisting of an extended family
and friends is available to the child...
(c) In the case of a child 16 years of age or older, the following guidelines should be
considered by the court in determining whether to adopt the permanency plan submit-
ted by the department:
(1) whether the permanency plan submitted to the court includes the servtces
planned for the child to make the transition from foster care to independent living
and
(2) whether this transition is in the best interest of the child.
TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000).
146. See In re K.C.M.. 4 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex. App.-Houston fIst Dist.] 1999. pet.
denied): see also In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846. 847 (Tex. 1980) (favoring a presumption in
maintaining the family as serving the best interest of the child): Allred v. Harris County
Child Welfare Unit, 615 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex. App.-Houston [list Dist.) 198UJ, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (citing In re E.S.M.. 550 S.W.2d 749. 757 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston fist Dist.] 1977.
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating that being with the parent is presumed to be in the child's best
interest).
147. See, e.g.. Holley v. Adams. 544 S.W.2d at 371-72: lit re K.C(.M.. 4 SW.3d at 399.
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court reversed a judgment terminating an incarcerated mother's rights af-
ter evidence was brought forth to show that the mother had turned her
life around in jail.148 In that case, the court determined that termination
was unjust and against "the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence. 149
In balancing the child's best interests against the presumption that the
child is best served by maintaining the parent-child relationship, the court
should consider other factors in addition to the factors outlined in the
TFC 5° The factors available under the TFC allow a court to presume
that even the smallest deficiencies make a child's family dysfunctional,
and therefore it is easier for the court to determine that any slightly dys-
functional placement is not in the best interest of the child.' t Thus, con-
sideration of the Family Code factors alone makes it more difficult for
children to be placed with certain relatives.
IV. THE IMPACT ON INCARCERATED WOMEN
While there are many cases involving incarcerated fathers' attempts to
maintain their parental rights, women offenders are particularly at risk
for termination of their parental rights. 52 Women have historically been
treated differently upon entering the prison system and, in turn, are af-
fected in different ways than men.153
There are several reasons for the disparate impact on women offend-
ers. The primary reason is that single mothers have historically held the
care, custody, and control of her child. 54 The following table is an exam-
148. See In re K.C.M., 4 S.W.3d at 399; see also In re D.E.G., No. 01-99-00143-CV,
2000 WL 145109, at 3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 10, 2000, n.w.h.) (not desig-
nated for publication) (reversing a trial court's finding that a parent's incarceration endan-
gered the child).
149. See In re K.C.M., 4 S.W.3d at 399.
150. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b).
151. According to an August 2000 Bureau of Justice Statistics report, there was a 98%
increase in the number of minors with an imprisoned mother between 1991 and 1999. See
MUMOLA, supra note 4, at 2.
152. See Johnston & Gabel, supra note 54; see also Dowdy, supra note 16, at BI
(pointing to the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 as having a great impact on an
incarcerated woman's loss of parental rights); Dressel et al., supra note 59, at 90-94 (af-
firming the belief that incarcerated mothers stand a greater chance of losing their parental
rights).
153. See Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450, 1452 n.2 (1989); see also Genty, supra
note 14, at 167.
154. See Bloom, supra note 3, at 25 (stating "seventy-three percent of incarcerated
women reported that they had custody of their children at the time of their arrest"); see
also Kampfner, supra note 139, at 89 (stating that the majority of incarcerated mothers
were their children's primary caretaker).
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ple of the disproportionate impact incarceration has on the mother-child
relationship as opposed to the father-child relationship.
TABLE 1.i5
Percentage of State Inmate Parents. 1997
Male Female
Parents who lived with their children 43.8% 64.3%
prior to admission
Current caregiver*
Child's other parent 89.6% 28.0%
Child's grandparent 13.3 52.9
Other relative 4.9 25.7
Foster home/Agency 1.8 9.6
Friends/Other 4.9 10.4
*Some prisoners had children in different homes.
Another factor for the disparate treatment of women is the lack of con-
tact with their children.'56 Women offenders do not receive appropriate
services in prison to help them achieve the requirements for reunification
established by CPS. 15 7 Due to their limited contact and deficient ser-
vices, they are unable to maintain a mother-child bond and are unable to
practice any parenting skills they might have learned during their incar-
ceration. 158 For instance, in the District of Columbia prison system, wo-
men are housed farther away from the city than men, thereby resulting in
a substantial restriction on family visitation. t '"
155. See MUMOLA. supra note 4. at 2: see also Beckerman, supra note 1U, at 514.
156. See Johnston & Gabel, supra note 54. at 17-18; see also BLoomt & SUi-ItIIAI,
supra note 9, at 26 (discussing their survey of women in prison that found that over half of
the women surveyed had not seen their children since their incarceration): Norman, supra
note 49, at 128-29: Julie A. Norman. Parent-Child Visitation in the Jail or Prison, if clit
DREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS 135-142 (Katherine Gabel & Denise Johnston eds..
1995).
157. See Johnston & Gabel. supra note 54. at 17-18: see also Bt-oot & Stit~ut,
supra note 9. at 43 (reinforcing the fact that it is almost impossible for incarcerated
mothers to meet the established reunification goals set by the caseworker).
158. See Bloom, supra note 3. at 21: see also Beckerman. supra note 10. at 515 (citing
the difficulties women have in obtaining visits with their children, especially with children
placed in foster care): Block & Potthast. supra note 9. at 566 (1998) (discussing the many
reasons some caregivers cite as reasons not to take the children to see their mother).
159. See Pitts v. Thornburgh. 866 F.2d 1450. 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1989): see also Young &
Smith, supra note 52 (affirming that prison "'[flacilities are typically located in remote ar-
eas, sometimes hundreds of miles from the family's home, making visitation extremely
difficult for families with limited resources").
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In Pitts v. Thornburgh,6 ° the court recognized that "because ... wo-
men are imprisoned considerably farther from the District than are simi-
larly situated male offenders . . . [the women] consequently suffer a
substantial burden."' 16' However, the court declined to apply a reasona-
ble relationship analysis to the case and determined that the burden was a
valid result of a legitimate penalogical interest under a heightened scru-
tiny approach.' 61 In other words, the penal system's interest outweighed
the interest that women have in visiting their children in prison and the
interest children have in visiting their mothers.163
Conversely, the In re D. T 64 court ordered a new trial after the paren-
tal rights of a mother had been terminated. 65 One of the factual findings
made by the court included that the mother was denied visitation with
her child based on a Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Ser-
vices (TDPRS) policy stating that visitation was not in the child's best
interest since the mother had been transferred to a facility outside the
region where her son had been placed.1 66
Although an individual cannot deny that a father's incarceration is a
traumatic experience for families, children and families of incarcerated
mothers are believed to have a substantially more difficult, complex, and
traumatic experience. 67 It is said that the cost of a mother's incarcera-
tion is one that crosses much more than monetary lines.' 68 A mother's
incarceration, as compared with a father's, implicates policy and social
160. 866 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
161. Id. at 1453.
162. See id.
163. See generally id.
164. 34 S.W.3d 625 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, no pet. h.).
165. See id. Similarly, the In re K.C.M. court reversed a lower court judgment termi-
nating a mother's parental rights because of her incarceration. See In re K.C.M., 4 S.W.3d
392, 399 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
166. See In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d at 629.
167. See Barry et al., supra note 49, at 148; see also Beckerman, supra note 10, at 517-
19 (discussing the great shift in the family and the resulting negative impact on the whole
family as a result of a mother's incarceration).
168. Teena Farmon, the warden at the Central California Women's Facility in Madera,
California, believes that women in prison face a great deal of emotional pain from losing
their children due to incarceration. Investigative Reports, supra note 75. Ms. Farmon said,
[T]he same way women care about their children, the women inmates continue to
care. What destroys them, what hurts them more, when you see the pain more, is
when something has happened with their children and the effect of their not being
there is thrown in their face. The fact that they weren't there to help, they weren't
there to make a difference.
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institutions beyond the court and correctional system, and reaches across
generations. 169
V. PROPOSAL
The number of mothers in prison is increasing at an alarming rate.
Consequently, the percentage of children with incarcerated parents is si-
multaneously on the rise. However, the country has experienced a de-
cline in services focusing on protection of the family and has seen a
reduced emphasis on maintaining the parent-child relationship.'"" Subse-
quently, termination cases are likely to continue to increase nationwide.
In an attempt to maintain the parental rights of incarcerated mothers,
protect the best interest of the child, and ensure the preservation of the
family, the following proposal provides a comprehensive framework and
strict guidelines for both CPS and the courts.
The establishment of a more precise and strictly defined reasonable
efforts standard within TDPRS and the Texas court system is a more
modem and constitutionally based response to the need for family pres-
ervation. 17 1 Currently, the Department is not required to prove that it
has made reasonable efforts to preserve the family before removing the
child from the home.172 Nevertheless, TDPRS must show that reasona-
ble efforts to reunify a child with his or her family were made prior to
moving towards termination of a parent's rights.
173
Before determining whether or not to terminate a parent's rights, the
presiding judge must determine whether the Department has met this
burden.1 74 However, the recurring problem within the child welfare sys-
tem is that there is no clear standard for the courts to follow. Com-
169. See Dressel et al.. supra note 59. at 90.
170. See Novoa, supra note 15. at 24 (acknowledging that recent amendments to sec-
tion 161.001 of the Texas Family Code have made "it easier to terminate the parental rights
of a child who is in state custody"): Dressel et al.. supra note 59. at 90 (explaining the
development of a "family separation paradigm" in policies across the correctional and
human services system).
171. See, e.g., Novoa. supra note 15. at 35-40 (emphasizing that public poli y recog-
nizes the desirability and success of family preservation, and asserting that successful fam-
ily preservation programs often include the extended family).
172. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 262.101(2). .102(a)(2) (Vernon 19%6 & Supp.
2000).
173. See id. § 161.003(a)(3).
174. See id § 161.206(a): see also NAT'L COUNCIL OF- JTNIL: & F.\iii ' t Ri
JUDGES, RESOURCE GUIDELINES: IMIPROVING COURI PRAC'-- 1. ('1111-1 Ait sti 5N!)
NEGLECT CASES 95, available at http:/lpppncjfcj.orgihtml/publications.htmt/publications.
html (last visited Apr. 14. 2001) (promoting the determination of whether the statutory
grounds for termination have been met, prior to a court ordering termination).
20011
THE SCHOLAR
pounding the lack of a clear standard is the fact that neither the
legislature nor the courts have defined reasonable efforts.
The lack of clarity regarding the reasonable efforts standard requires
that a strict definition of reasonable efforts be imposed. Moreover, the
need for timely decision making and equally timely action on the part of
both courts and CPS caseworkers is required in cases involving children
of incarcerated women.175
The reasonable efforts standard proposed in this comment consists of
five parts, all of which are necessary in all cases involving the termination
of parental rights. Its focus, however, is on removal and termination
cases involving an incarcerated parent.
First, CPS contact with either an incarcerated mother or father after
removal of their child shall be timely. Second, CPS contact with any
known relatives after removal of a child shall be timely. Third, CPS shall
frequently coordinate and conduct visits between the parent and the child.
Once a case is set for termination, the State must show, by clear and
convincing evidence, that it has made reasonable efforts to preserve the
family. This burden shall be imposed on the State at every hearing on the
case. Finally, a court shall make an official determination regarding
whether the State has met the reasonable efforts standard.
The proposed standard is to function as follows: the caseworker must
make contact with the incarcerated parent within five hours of picking up
the child to ascertain whether there is a relative available for immediate
placement. If locating information is obtained, telephone contact must
be made with the relatives within two hours after obtaining the contact
information. The caseworker is to then make a personal visit with the
parent at the detaining facility within twenty-four hours of picking up the
child in order to make physical contact with the parent. During this visit,
the caseworker is to provide the parent with either the name and tele-
phone number of the relatives with whom the child is placed or the De-
partment's notice of removal, which is provided only to the parent and
contains the caseworker's contact information.176
In the even that the Department officially removes the child, the
caseworker must then complete the necessary affidavit of removal. 7 7 In
the original affidavit of removal submitted to the court at the initial hear-
ing, the caseworker must include the names and locating information of
175. See, e.g., NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, supra note
174. In addition to recommending widespread changes within the court system, the Coun-
cil emphasized the need for timeliness in all areas of court and agency practice. See id. at
14.
176. See 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 700.1102 (1999) (identifying the need to provide
parents with a written notice of removal).
177. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.106(b) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000).
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relatives provided by the parent or child. In addition, the caseworker
must attach a certified document' 78 demonstrating that contact with the
parent was made within twenty-four hours of removal. At the initial
hearing, the court shall make a finding specifically stating whether the
Department made reasonable efforts to preserve the family up to that
point in time.
If the child continues to remain in the state's custody prior to the ad-
versary hearing scheduled for the fourteenth day after the signing of the
temporary order, the caseworker must make a minimum of two addi-
tional contacts with the parent. These contacts are to be made under the
pretext of gathering additional relative information. Prior to the adver-
sary hearing, the caseworker must complete background checks of every
relative. The report submitted by the caseworker at the adversary hear-
ing is to include all the names and locating information for the possible
placements and copies of the results of all background checks conducted.
The court shall again make the determination of whether the Department
has made reasonable efforts to preserve the family. If the court finds that
the caseworker did not make the required contacts with the incarcerated
parent, the court shall note it in the record and find that reasonable ef-
forts were not made.
Upon submission of the service plan, submitted no later than the forty-
fifth day after the temporary order, 7 9 the court must review the service
plan and determine whether it is reasonable when balanced against the
parent's incarceration. If the court determines that the service plan is not
appropriate, the court shall order the Department to file an amended
plan. This may be ordered at the status hearing to be held no later than
the sixtieth day after the date of the temporary orders."
Prior to the status hearing, the Department must make a minimum of
two additional contacts with either the incarcerated parent or a relative
willing to take the child or assist in placing the child with another relative
or family friend. The caseworker must document these contacts and in-
clude the name, address, and phone number of the relative with whom
the contact was made. In addition, at least one visit between the parent
and child must be arranged and completed by the caseworker.
At the status hearing, the caseworker must present evidence that the
Department has met the efforts outlined in the checklist, and must bring
178. The document can include a general statement showing that the caseworker
made contact with the parent within twenty-four hours of removal and can be signed and
dated, including the time, by either the parent and caseworker or a detention officer and
caseworker.
179. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 263.101-.102 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000).
180. See id. §§ 263.201-.202.
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forth supporting evidence. The court shall then make a finding, stating
whether the Department met its burden of making reasonable efforts to
help preserve the family. The court shall also order the Department to
complete home studies of all eligible relatives, and designate a date by
which the studies are to be completed and submitted to the court for
review.
After the status hearing, the caseworker must again make at least three
contacts with either a relative or the incarcerated parent. In addition, the
caseworker must hold at least three visits between the child and the incar-
cerated parent before the Initial Permanency Hearing. The first visit and
family contact is to be conducted no later than the ninetieth day of the
temporary order, the second no later than the one hundred twentieth day
of the temporary order, and the third no later than the one hundred fifti-
eth day of the temporary order. These visits are to be conducted to en-
sure that continued contact with the family is made, and that the
caseworker and family continue to exchange information about possible
placements for the child.
The contacts with family shall again be documented including the
name, address, and phone number of the relative with whom the contact
was made. Documentation of the contacts and visits, and any other infor-
mation collected during the contacts, must be written and submitted to
the court along with the Permanency Progress Report.
In addition to completing the visits and contacts prior to the initial per-
manency hearing, the caseworker must again complete background
checks of every relative whose information was provided after the status
hearing. This information is to also be included in the permanency pro-
gress report, and is to again include all the names, location, and back-
ground information of the possible relative placements.
Furthermore, the caseworker must complete a second affidavit stating
whether the required contacts, visits, background checks, and any addi-
tional court ordered tasks have been accomplished. The caseworker's af-
fidavit is to be submitted with the permanency progress report or filed
with the court in advance of the initial permanency hearing.
The initial permanency hearing, to be held no later than one hundred
eighty days after the temporary order is signed, involves discussing case
progress and goals."' 1 At the initial permanency hearing, the caseworker
must again present evidence that the Department has met the efforts out-
lined in the checklist. This may be supported by the affidavit previously
submitted by the caseworker. The court shall then make another finding
stating whether or not the Department satisfactorily met its burden to
make reasonable efforts to preserve the family. If the Department has
181. See id. §§ 263.304-.306.
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submitted any positive home studies, the court may order placement of
the child with the eligible relatives. If no positive home studies are sub-
mitted and other eligible relatives are available, the court shall again or-
der the Department to conduct and complete home studies of relatives.
Finally, the Department is charged with transitioning and placing the
child or children into a relative placement upon a home study's approval.
In order to ensure a speedy relative placement, it is recommended that
the court grant the Department the authority to make the decision to
place without having to return to court. Following a successful place-
ment, the case should be dismissed, and a final order in the case entered.
Along with the aforementioned guidelines, the court shall enter a find-
ing stating whether the Department has shown, by clear and convincing
evidence, that reasonable efforts have been made. This finding is to be
made, not only at the termination hearing, but also at every hearing h I !
in the case. Moreover, the clear and convincing standard is to be tol-
lowed by the state appellate courts and the Supreme Court of Texas as
well. It is not enough that one court be bound by this standard, but nec-
essary that all courts apply consistent evidentiary standards at each step
of the termination process.
The standard is designed to apply to cases involving incarcerated par-
ents and their child or children. It is a comprehensive standard and spe-
cifically applies to cases involving children who are either immediately
placed with relatives or who continue to be placed under the State's su-
pervision. In addition, it is applicable to children whose parents are jailed
and then convicted and incarcerated, or whose parents are immediately
incarcerated.
The "Checklist for CPS Intervention Upon Parental Incarceration"
(Appendix 1) provides a more specific, step-by-step procedure to be fol-
lowed by the caseworker upon a child's removal as a result of a parent's
incarceration. The document is to be used as a checklist by the
caseworker to ensure that all necessary steps are taken to preserve the
family, and it is to function as a litmus test in determining whether rea-
sonable efforts to preserve the family have been made. Some of the tasks
included in the form are already required by the TFC. These tasks have
been indicated with an asterisk (*) so that they may be distinguished from
the tasks proposed here.
Ideally. the proposal and supporting document is to represent the rea-
sonable efforts standard. Taken as a whole, the proposal represents the
steps required to meet the reasonable efforts requirement. Therefore,
completion of every task outlined in the proposal and included in the
form is equal to successfully meeting the reasonable efforts requirement.
The document is by no means all encompassing, but is designed to pro-
vide a more structured guideline to both CPS and state courts. The docu-
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ment is, therefore, designed to present a total picture of the Department's
efforts in preserving Texas families.
Courts have noted that the State has the burden to show, by clear and
convincing evidence, that it is both in the child's best interest to terminate
and that at least one of the other elements listed in the code exists. "8 2
The proposal outlined above is, therefore, not all-encompassing. The key
to effectively incorporating the above-outlined proposal is to implement a
Family Code requirement that the reasonable efforts standard be proved,
by clear and convincing evidence, at every step of the judicial process in
termination cases involving incarcerated parents. Furthermore, the
"Checklist for CPS Intervention Upon Parental Incarceration" and the
step-by-step description outlined above needs to be included in the Ad-
ministrative Code so that CPS understands exactly how to proceed in
such cases.
Having experienced the casework process for several years, I can say
with absolute certainty that some caseworkers do not fulfill the reasona-
ble efforts requirement for family preservation, not because of fraud on
the part of the caseworker, but because of an unclear and unstructured
definition of reasonable efforts. The vagueness fosters a disproportionate
finding by courts across the state regarding the reasonable efforts made
by the Department. The problem with not having a standard definition
or guideline for "reasonable efforts" is that reasonable efforts can be con-
strued differently by one caseworker or judge, and therefore applied non-
uniformly to cases. The reasonable efforts standard should therefore be
clear and must be proved at every step of the judicial process.183 Reason-
able efforts are to be proven, beyond just a statement by the caseworker,
but by clear and convincing evidence that all efforts for family placement
and preservation have been exhausted. Nothing less is acceptable when
children and constitutional considerations are involved.
VI. CONCLUSION
The establishment of the reasonable efforts standard in child abuse and
neglect cases by The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
brought child welfare policy in line with legally established evidentiary
guidelines. However, since no strict guidelines regarding the meaning of
reasonable efforts were ever established, the system and the courts have
imposed this "guideline" on a case by case basis.
182. See id. § 161.001.
183. The reasonable efforts standard should be proved at the initial hearing, the ad-
versary hearing, the status hearing, all permanency hearings, and the termination hearing.
See generally TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. §§ 161.206-263.305 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000).
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With the number of children in foster care and the number of incarcer-
ated mothers increasing, it is time that strict guidelines with regard to the
reasonable efforts standard be imposed." It is not enough that the
courts use their own discretion and the mere word of the CPS caseworker
to terminate a relationship that the Supreme Court of the United States
has deemed to be deserving of constitutional protection.
The trend in public policy involving child abuse and neglect continues
to be guided by the goal of enabling families to protect and appropriately
parent their children."8 5 The guiding principle behind child protective
services is that helping a parent restore effective parenting skills is pre-
ferred when compared to placement of the child out of the home. '" Sim-
ilarly, focusing on preservation of the family, as opposed to out-of-home
placement, is a much more cost-effective response to this social issue."t 7
When the State is obligated to determine the future of a family, the
rights of women as mothers cannot be overlooked. The importance of
family with regard to protecting the well-being, safety, and rights of a
child must also be considered in termination cases. The outlined proposal
addresses the necessary considerations and attempts to protect the family
and the rights of both parents and children. The proposal offers twenty-
four tasks, each representing a detailed and task-oriented definition of
reasonable efforts. The twenty-four tasks also symbolize each month that
an incarcerated mother has before her rights are terminated. This propo-
sal, however, represents only the minimally acceptable effort for preserv-
ing the constitutionally protected relationship between incarcerated
parents and their children: ideally, much more reinforcement of this
eroded right is in order.
The fact that a parent and child can be permanently separated as a
result of a parent's incarceration is disturbing." Furthermore, it is tragic
184. See Seymore, supra note 50. at 470 (stating that child welfare agencies wil con-
tinue to see a significant increase in the number of children with incarcerated parents).
185. Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89. 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (appropriating funds to state public welfare agencies to
strengthen services to children and families): see also Am. HumtNA-.i As%'N. supra note 20,
at 3. See generally Child Welfare Act. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 5Ui (1980) tcodified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (codifying the idea that the Department
should make "reasonable efforts" to keep families together).
186. See AM. HUMANE Ass'N. supra note 20. at 3; Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regula-
tory Servs., supra note 44 (affirming the Department's primary intent to preserve the fam-
ily without having to remove the child from the home).
187. See Am. HUMANE ASS'N. supra note 20. at 3: Dowdy. supra note 1 (reporting
that the child welfare system is being greatly burdened by the increase in incarcerated
women).
188. Some also find that a mother's incarceration is often more disturbing than a fa-
ther's since mothers are more often the primary caretakers of their children. Se' Weiser.
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that a woman's parental rights can be terminated due to incarceration for
reasons other than harming a child. 8 9 Texas statutes should not punish a
mother and her innocent child by terminating her parental rights upon
incarceration. Rather, statutes should protect the family and encourage
extended family members to maintain strong relationships.
supra note 16 (recognizing that the incarceration of women, rather than men, has a greater
impact on the family); see also Pat Swift, Life Behind Bars Especially Grim for Women
Inmates, BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 26, 2000, at C7 (emphasizing that a greater number of wo-
men with children are being incarcerated). Swift states that several studies show that wo-
men prisoners are more concerned with "retaining custody of and relationships with their
children ... [while] male prisoners [are] less affected by those issues." Id.
189. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000) (outlining
what is required so that a court may order the involuntary termination of the parent-child
relationship, including incarceration); see also Safe Families Act, § 103(a)(3)(E) (1997)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (codifying the requirement to
terminate parental rights of a child in state custody for fifteen of twenty-two months); The
Legal Aid Rights Project, Testimony of the Legal Aid Society on the Effects of Incarceration
on Families, at http://www.legal-aid.org/testimony5-30.htm (last visited May 30, 2000)
(describing the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 as giving the states the power to
terminate parental rights if a child is in foster care for fifteen of twenty-two months, which
disproportionately affects incarcerated parents).
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APPENDIX
CHECKLIST FOR CPS INTERVENIION UPON
PARENTAL INCARCERATION' )
Date Completed
1. Contact with the incarcerated parent within five hours of
picking up the child
2. Telephone contact with possible placement within two hours
of Task 1
3. Personal visit with detained parent within twenty four hours
of picking up the child
4. Submit affidavit of completion or non-completion of 1, 2. and
3 at Initial hearing'91
_ 5. First contact with parent after Ex Parte hearing
6. Second contact with parent after Ex Parte hearing
7. Completion of criminal history checks of all possible
placements
8. Adversary Hearing - within 14 days of Temporary Order' 2
9. Submit Service Plan - within 45 days of Temporary Order' 9 '
__ 10. First contact with parent or relative after Adversary Hearing
__ 11. Second contact with parent or relative after Adversary
Hearing
__ 12. Visit between child and incarcerated parent between
Adversary and Status Hearing
___ 13. Status Hearing - within 60 days of Temporary Order"'M
____ 14. Submission of amended service plan (if applicable)"
__ 15. a. First contact with parent or relative no later than 90 days
after Temporary Order
190. This form is designed to assist the caseworker in following specific procedures
needed to ensure that the Department made a reasonable effort for preservation of the
family. This form should be a permanent part of the child's file and should be submitted to
the court prior to every hearing.
191. See TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. § 262.106 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000).
192. See id. § 262.201.
193. See id. §§ 263.101-.106.
194. See id. §§ 263.201-.202.
195. See id. § 263.104.
2001]
230 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 3:193
b. Visit between child and incarcerated parent no later than
90 days after Temporary Order
__ 16. a. Second contact with parent or relative no later than 120
days after Temporary Order
b. Visit between child and incarcerated parent no later than
120 days after Temporary Order
- 17. a. Third contact with parent or relative no later than 150
days after Temporary Order
__ b. Visit between child and incarcerated parent no later than
150 days after Temporary Order
- 18. Completion of criminal history checks of all new possible
placements - within 160 days of Temporary Order than 120
days after Temporary Order
- 19. Submit affidavit of completion or non-completion of required
contacts, visits, or court ordered activity - prior to Initial
Permanency Hearing
- 20. Initial Permanency Hearing1 96 - within 180 days of
Temporary Order1
97
- 21. Subsequent Permanency Hearing/s - no later than 120 days of
Initial Permanency Hearing 9
8
22. Approved Home Study - approved by court or department'99
23. Relative Placement
24. Final Order2 °°
196. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 263.304, .306 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000).
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 700.1504 (1999).
200. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 263.401-.403.
